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Abstract  
By investigating the effect of earnings quality on corporate social disclosure (CSD) in the 
context of Vietnam, this study tests whether firms uphold managerial opportunism based on 
the agency theory or social responsibility based on stakeholder theory. It also tests the 
moderating effect of state and foreign ownership on the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD. This study finds that the long-term perspective argument dominates in the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD, indicating that earnings quality is positively 
and significantly associated with CSD. The study also finds that the increasing proportion of 
shares held by the government in firms weakens the relationship between earnings quality 
and CSD.  
 
Keywords: earnings quality, corporate social disclosure, agency theory, stakeholder theory 
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Introduction 
The debate about managers behaviour whether self-centered or altruistic has re-surfaced with 
the broadened disclosure that comprise financial and non-financial with non-financial taking 
a large volume in annual reports and company websites. The debate has taken a center stage 
with non-financial disclosure such as corporate social disclosure (CSD) because they are 
voluntary and often not subjected to a formal audit. For instance, Prior, Surroca, and Tribo 
(2008) reported that multinational firms across 26 countries used CSD to diverge attention 
from earnings management. Choi, Lee, and Park (2013) subsequently found in the context of 
Korea that ownership structure can influence managerial motivation to engage in CSD. The 
accelerated economic growth in Vietnam, not only makes a loud appeal for foreign capital 
but has taken into a period of transitional flux from state ownership to private ownership of 
enterprises, with a mix of partially state-owned and partially foreign-owned enterprises. The 
economic welfare of the Vietnamese society depends not only on the public funding but also 
private activities and taking responsibility for the society (Vorobyeva and Phuong, 2017). 
These findings from the literature bring forth examining the relationship between CSD and 
earnings quality not only to contribute to the public policy in Vietnam but also to contribute 
to a broader understanding  as a few studies have examined the influence of earnings quality 
on CSD Yip, Staden, and Cahan 2011, Chih, Shen, and Kang 2008, Kim, Park, and Wier 
2012.  
The managerial motivation behind CSD has come under much debate but the managerial 
motivation in the context of earnings quality on CSD has received little attention. Certain 
managerial motivations are identifiable through actions taken by them, certain other 
managerial motivations are implicit in actions and become noticeable through outcomes. In 
this study, we take the position that the firm ownership (to the extent of state ownership, or 
foreign ownership) as an implicit motivation for managers to take a perspective on CSD. 
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Managers can take a short-term opportunistic perspective or a long-term efficiency 
perspective on CSD. When firms report earnings that are sustainable, predictable, and less 
manipulated by accruals, it is indicative that firms’ earnings are reported responsibly and 
predictably. It is likely that firms can take a long-term efficiency perspective on CSD. 
However, in an emerging nation such as Vietnam, there is also a possibility that managers 
behave opportunistically to benefit from the expansive economic growth.  
Our empirical results and contributions resulting from those findings are as follows. First, 
the standardised aggregate earnings quality is positively correlated with CSD when all firms 
are considered. The finding contributes to the understanding that managers can take an 
efficient perspective in non-financial disclosure, along with the established notion that 
managers take an opportunistic view on financial disclosure. The divided managerial 
perspective between financial and non-financial disclosure can inform owners and 
policymakers about divergent frameworks and accountabilities required for the two strands of 
disclosure.  Second, this relationship becomes weaker with the state having increasing 
ownership in firms, which suggests that when the earnings quality becomes low in a state-
owned company, the state-owned company is likely to decrease the stakeholder-relevant 
CSD. The finding informs the statutory policymakers to closely monitor the nature and the 
magnitude of state influence on managers efficiency perspective and may consider including 
CSD and their activities as part of audit to uphold public policy performance matrix on 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Third, our evidence shows that foreign ownership has 
no moderating effect on the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. The finding 
contributes to the public policy framework to hold foreign ownership in Vietnam become 
responsible not only to contribute through taxes but also through socially beneficial activities 
to Vietnam and requiring such disclosure in annual reports. Fourth, the three-dimensional 
CSD index developed in this study contributes to a methodological improvement in 
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measuring stakeholder-relevant CSD, making findings and facilitate stakeholder-relevant 
policy revisions.  
Related literature and hypotheses 
Agency theory is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interests 
of a firm’s owners (shareholders) and its management (Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore, 
firms may use different methods, such as compensation plans or voluntary disclosures, to 
reduce conflicting interests between managers and shareholders. Accounting information is 
made by agents to communicate financial position, performance, and change in financial 
position to principals. Any information asymmetry between the mangers and shareholders 
can lead to the moral hazard problem. Agency theory on corporate social responsibility/CSD, 
argues that managers can opportunistically use corporate resources to pursue goals that 
enhance their own utility in ways that are unlikely to provide significant returns to 
shareholders. For example, Vanhamme and Grobben (2009) find that firms using corporate 
social responsibility in times of crisis can uphold reputation only when they have a history of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Accordingly, Friedman (1970) argues that 
companies that take part in corporate social responsibility practices only want to benefit from 
the reputation and the publicity they receive, with the sole objective of maximizing their own 
profits. Because managerial decisions directly impact all the stakeholder groups, managers 
can be viewed as not only the agents of shareholders but also the agents of other stakeholders 
(Jones 1995). Consistent with these arguments, studies indicate that companies resort to 
corporate social responsibility in order to hide their manipulating reported earnings (Prior, 
Surroca, and Tribó 2008, Chih, Shen, and Kang 2008, Petrovits 2006). To test this view, this 
study proposes the following hypothesis which is based on managers’ opportunistic 
incentives: 
H1A: There is a negative relationship between CSD and earnings quality. 
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Based on the stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984), some researchers suggest that corporate 
social responsibility is part of a long-run perspective of economic gain that may not be 
financially measurable but may provide a valuable asset for future profitability, and 
eventually enhances the financial status of firms (Carroll 1999, Davis 1960, Choi, Lee, and 
Park 2013). Davis (1960) suggests that taking care of social responsibilities and financial 
status is a necessary activity for firms, for long-run sustainability. Accordingly, Choi et al. 
(2013) propose that a firm’s quality of earnings needs to be commensurate with its corporate 
social responsibility activities to meet the needs of the stakeholders. Studies also indicate that 
firms’ engagement with corporate social responsibility mitigates earnings management 
(Scholtens and Kang 2013, Kim, Park, and Wier 2012). Based on this long-run perspective, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1B: There is a positive relationship between CSD and earnings quality. 
Vietnamese listed firms have high state ownership and control as their institutional 
environment. This is partly attributed to the fact that most of these now listed firms were 
previously SOEs. The average level of state ownership of listed firms in this study is 27 per 
cent. State ownership in firms assists the government to enact social objectives through firms, 
and this study considers the impact of ownership structure on the CSD practices–earnings 
quality relationship. 
State managers have less pressure to manipulate firms’ earnings because their financial 
incentive structure is not connected with firms’ earnings (Wang and Yung, 2011). The 
government’s requirement is to obtain a guaranteed return from firms with state ownership. 
The government is also prepared to provide additional funds to those firms (Ding, Zhang, and 
Zhang 2007, Jiang and Habib 2009, Wang and Yung 2011). As a result, firms with higher 
state ownership have fewer incentives to disclose more information because increasing state 
ownership in firms provides greater access to firms’ information on (state) demand (Jiang and 
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Habib 2009). Another reason is that firms with higher state ownership are discouraged from 
disclosing more information because of political constraints (Ghazali and Weetman 2006). 
There should, therefore, be a negative interaction between state ownership and earnings 
quality in determining a firm’s CSD practices. 
H2: More state ownership will weaken the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. 
Firms with higher foreign ownership are required to increase informative disclosures in 
order to raise and retain foreign investment (Boubakri et al. 2007, Haniffa and Cooke 2005). 
Strengthening the supply of capital from foreign investors is crucial in the development of 
many emerging capital markets (Bokpin and Isshaq 2009, Mangena and Tauringana 2007). 
Firms with higher foreign ownership are considered to be associated with better monitoring 
and are thus expected to reduce the ability of insiders to manipulate earnings for private 
purposes (Doidge 2004, Hail and Leuz 2009). Foreign ownership also has a positive and 
significant relation with the level of information transparency and in the long term can 
stimulate the growth of a firm, capital markets, and a country as a whole (Ho, Tower, and 
Taylor 2013). 
In the Vietnamese context, the government has taken various steps to increase foreign 
ownership by reducing restrictions on foreign investment. The foreign ownership maximum 
limitation was increased from 20 per cent in 2000 to 30 per cent in 2003 and finally to 49 per 
cent in 2005 for listed firms except for banks. The majority of foreign owners are from 
developed countries that have stronger financial regulatory systems. These foreign investors 
are more likely to be aware of the importance of financial and non-financial information in 
investment decision making. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: More foreign ownership will strengthen the relation between earnings quality and CSD. 
Measures and the sample 
Earnings quality measures 
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This study constructed an standardised aggregate earnings quality score based on four 
accounting measures of earnings attributes used in prior studies (Francis et al. 2004, 
Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek, and Nabar 2006), namely, accruals quality, earnings persistence, 
earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness. Using the autoregressive approach, this 
study uses these four earnings quality measures as specific to firms and each quality measure 
is estimated by rolling over the specific measure over a five-year period. Because the accruals 
quality measure requires lagged and forward data, a firm is included in the year t sample if 
data are available for seven years from years t-5 to t+1.  
Accruals quality 
Accruals quality (AQ) in this study is based on the widely used Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
statistical calculation technique, where it is measured by relating total current accruals to cash 
flows from operations. The extent to which current accruals map to cash flows from 
operations indicates higher earnings quality. Therefore, lower standard deviation of residuals 
represents higher earnings quality. AQ as the standard deviation of residuals (εj) is obtained 
from the following regression: 
TCAj,t = φ0 + φ1CFOj,t-1 + φ2CFOj,t + φ3CFOj,t+1 + εj,t  (1) 
Where TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t (ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t – ΔCashj,t + 
ΔSTDEBTj,t); CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t; ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change 
in current assets between year t-1 and year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in current liabilities 
between year t-1 and year t; ΔCashj,t = firm j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t; 
and ΔSTDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t. 
All variables in equation (1) are deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1.  
Earnings persistence 
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Earnings persistence (PERSIS) is the extent to which current period earnings reflect future 
period earnings. Following Francis et al. (2004), PERSIS is measured as the negative of the 
slope coefficient estimate, ϕ1,j, from the following model:  
Earnj,t = ϕ0,j + ϕ1,jEarnj,t-1 + ѵj,t    (2) 
Where Earnj,t = firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t. All variables in 
equation (2) are deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1. Larger values (i.e., less negative) 
of PERSIS indicate less earnings quality. 
Earnings predictability  
Earnings predictability (PREDICT) is the ability of earnings to predict itself (Lipe 1990). Our 
measure of PREDICT is the standard deviation of the residuals (ѵj) from equation (2), 
following Francis et al. (2004). Larger values of PREDICT imply less earnings quality. 
Earnings smoothness 
This study adopts the measure of earnings smoothness (SMOOTH) in Francis et al. (2004) as 
the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items scaled by 
beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by 
beginning total assets. Larger values of SMOOTH imply less earnings quality. 
The standardised aggregate earnings quality score 
Based on the four individual earnings quality measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, 
SMOOTH), this study constructs a standardized aggregate earnings quality score. Based on 
how the individual earnings attributes are ascertained, the larger the value of the individual 
earnings quality measure, the lower the earnings quality. Following Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003), the four individual earnings quality values are arranged in descending order, 
so that a higher ranked value now represents higher earnings quality. The standardized 
aggregate earnings quality score of a firm is computed by averaging the firm rankings for the 
four individual earnings quality measures. 
Page 10 of 34 
 
CSD measures 
This study constructs a three-dimensional CSD index where one dimension is the quantity of 
CSD, and other two relate to disclosure type quality and disclosure item quality. A content 
analysis of annual reports is used to measure the quantity of CSD. To ensure consistency, 
only one of the authors coded all the annual reports, and a set of basic coding rules was 
constructed to ensure reliability and validity. This was repeated after two weeks (Haji 2013) 
in order to avoid the possibility that the first and the second scoring might influence each 
other (Weetman and Ghazali 2006). As a second step to establish inter-rater reliability, 
another author coded ten randomly selected annual reports and found no significant 
difference between the two coders.  
This study uses the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 3.1 index, the social indicators in 
particular, to measure CSD practices in Vietnam. The social indicators in the GRI 3.1 index 
identify key performance aspects surrounding labor practices, human rights, society, and 
product responsibility. They consist of four aspects, including 15 items of labor practices and 
decent work indicators (LA1 to LA15), 11 items of human rights indicators (HR1 to HR11), 
10 society indicators (SO1 to SO10), and 9 product responsibility indicators (PR1 to PR9). 
The GRI framework items are used for CSD in this study because those reporting items have 
been standardized across the firms and objectives, regardless of their geographical location 
(Adams 2002). 
Measuring disclosure quantity 
In order to measure the disclosure quantity, this study examines the different items in the 
checklist using binary scores. This is consistent with CSD studies in emerging capital markets 
(Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui 2013, Haji 2013, Haniffa and Cooke 2005). The disclosure of 
an item within the checklist in the annual reports is scored as ”1”, while the non-disclosure of 
an item within the checklist in the annual reports is scored as ”0”.  
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Measuring disclosure item quality and disclosure type quality  
The binary approach to measuring disclosure quantity has been criticized because it assumes 
that all items are equally important (Barako, Hancock, and Izan 2006). Lu and Abeysekera 
(2014) create a combined disclosure quality measure using the importance of reporting items 
and the importance of different disclosure types. This study extends Lu and Abeysekera’s 
(2014) study by obtaining perceptions from 652 stakeholders about the importance of 
reporting items, rather than the 12 stakeholders used in that study.  
The two aspects of disclosure quality (i.e., disclosure type quality and disclosure item 
quality) in this CSD index are measured by surveying four stakeholder groups (employees, 
lawyers and regulators, local communities, and customers) to obtain their perceptions on 
disclosure type preference (i.e., narrative; monetary quantification; numerical quantification; 
both monetary and numerical), and about disclosure reporting items (i.e., items in the social 
indicators of the Global Reporting Initiative 3.1). The types of disclosure are narrative, 
monetary quantification (i.e. the amount of money), numerical quantification (i.e. the number 
or statistics), both monetary and numerical. The social indicators in the GRI 3.1 index consist 
of four aspects: labour practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. For the 
type of items, if the same item is disclosed more than once with different types, an average 
score is computed to allow each item to contribute to the overall results. 
The questionnaires were delivered by hand to the target stakeholder groups.1 Different 
stakeholder groups received different versions of the questionnaire. The social stakeholders 
included employees (labor stakeholders) who responded to the questionnaire for aspects of 
labor practices and decent work; customers (product stakeholders) who responded to the 
questionnaire for product responsibility aspects; members of local communities (society 
stakeholders) who responded to the questionnaire for societal aspects; and lawyers and 
                                                            
1 Given the limited number of pages allowed in the manuscript, the questionnaires are available upon request 
(See the Supplementary Material, available online). 
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regulators (human rights stakeholders) who responded to the questionnaire for human rights 
aspects. The questionnaire has a scale of zero (unimportant) to 10 (the most important), 
making it an 11-point scale. This increases the variance of responses obtained and makes the 
results more reliable (Dawes 2002, Hartley and Betts 2010). The stakeholder-specific groups 
were requested to rate each item from zero to 10 based on their perceptions of how important 
the item was to them and how the items should be disclosed. They were also asked for their 
perceptions on the importance of four disclosure types (i.e., narrative, monetary 
quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) for each item based 
on a rating scale from zero to 10. 
The weight for a particular item is calculated by summing the integer values assigned to 
the item and then dividing the total by the number of individuals who responded to the item. 
Similarly, the level of importance for each type (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, 
numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) of a particular item is calculated by 
summing the integer values assigned to each particular type of disclosure for each item and 
then dividing the total by the number of individuals who responded to this type. A mean 
score is used to summarize the response scores within a specific stakeholder group.  
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index 
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index is computed for each firm using the 
following equation: 
 1
* *
_
max( )
n
i i i
i
j
i
Quantity ItemQuality TypeQuality
CSD INDEX
SCORE


 (3) 
where CSD_INDEXj = a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index of firm j; Quantityi = 
the disclosure or non-disclosure of an item i with regard to this item’s disclosure type in firm 
j; ItemQualityi = the weight of the item i disclosed; TypeQualityi = the weight for the type 
(i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, or both monetary and 
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numerical) of the item i disclosed; n = the number of items in the checklist; and 
max(SCORE) = the maximum score of three disclosure dimensions for a given firm: 
disclosure quantity score * disclosure type quality score *disclosure item quality score. 
Control variables 
This study controls for firm characteristics such as return on assets (ROA), auditors 
(AUDIT), state ownership (STATE), foreign ownership (FOREIGN), and stock exchange 
location (STOCK_EX), which influence CSD (e.g., Purushothaman et al. 2000, Cormier, 
Ledoux, and Magnan 2011, Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a, Vu 2012).  
Prior studies show that female directors are active in contributing to social issues, and are 
more likely to sponsor charities and have stronger relationships with surrounding 
communities, shareholders, and other stakeholder groups (Siciliano 1996, Williams 2003, 
Bernardi and Threadgill 2010). Furthermore, recent literature shows that female directors are 
associated with higher earnings quality (Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai 2013, Srinidhi, Gul, and 
Tsui 2011). Hence, this study also uses female directors (FEMALE) as a control variable in 
examining the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. 
The relationship between earnings quality and CSD 
The hypotheses 1A and 1B regarding the effect of CSD on earnings quality are tested using 
an OLS estimator. The regression function is: 
       0 1 ,_ vari i j i i iCSD INDEX EQ control iables  (4) 
In order to test the hypotheses 2 and 3 about the effects of state and foreign ownership on 
CSD-earnings quality relation, the following regression is used: 
   
 
   
  
0 1 2 3
,
_
v a r
i i i i i i
j i i i
C S D IN D E X E Q E Q x S T A T E E Q x F O R E IG N
c o n t r o l i a b l e s  
(5) 
where CSD_INDEXi = firm i’s stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; iEQ = 
firm i’s standardised aggregate earnings quality score, calculated as the average rank across 
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the four individual measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, 
and earnings smoothness); and i = 1, …, 133 firms. 
The sample 
The sample consists of all Vietnamese listed firms for which the required data items are 
available, except for banks and other financial industry firms. This study examines the annual 
reports during the year ended 31 December 2010 to capture the quality of CSD of 
Vietnamese listed firms. The 2010 year was chosen in this study as on 15 January 2010, the 
Ministry of Finance in Vietnam issued the Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock 
Exchange with the aim of providing guidance to enhance the disclosure practices of 
Vietnamese listed firms. The individual earnings quality attributes are estimated by using 
five-year rolling windows from 2006 to 2010 to generate the 2010 earnings quality measures 
of the sample, similar to Francis et al. (2008). Accruals quality is one of four earnings quality 
measures in this study. Because estimating this measure requires lagged and forward data, 
this study generated the 2010 accruals quality measure by using the financial statement data 
items for seven years, from 2005 to 2011.   
The financial statement data items are extracted from the websites for Ho Chi Minh stock 
exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi stock exchange (HNX) for the fiscal years 2005 to 2011. The 
year 2005 is when HNX came into operation. The final sample, with all required data 
available, includes 133 firms.  
The results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, shows the ratings awarded by the employees to the various reporting items 
concerning the labor aspect (LA). The highest mean score for those reporting items was 7.47 
and the lowest was 6.44, out of a maximum possible score of 10. In analyzing the disclosure 
types for the 15 reporting items of the labor aspect, employee respondents rated the highest 
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scores for items with numerical disclosures (60% or 9 items), and for reporting items with 
both monetary and numerical disclosures (40% or 6 items). Employees assigned the lowest 
scores for the items with monetary disclosures (73.33% or 11 items), and for the items with 
narrative disclosures (26.67% or 4 items).  
Table 1, Panel B, provides the ratings awarded by lawyers and regulators to the various 
information items about the human rights aspect (HR). The highest mean score for the 
information items was 8.19 and the lowest was 6.38. Related to the disclosure types, out of 11 
items in the human rights aspect, lawyers and regulators assigned the highest scores for items 
with numerical disclosures (81.82% or 9 items), and for items with both monetary and 
numerical disclosures (18.18% or 2 items). They assigned the lowest scores for items with 
narrative disclosures (90.91% or 10 items) and items with monetary disclosures (9.09% or 1 
item).  
Table 1, Panel C, presents the ratings assigned by the members of local communities for 
the various reporting items having to do with the societal aspect (SO). The highest mean 
score for the reporting items was 7.92 and the lowest was 6.22. Related to the disclosure 
types, interestingly, out of 10 items in the societal aspect, local communities assigned the 
highest scores for all 10 items with both monetary and numerical disclosures. They assigned 
the lowest mean scores to all 10 items with narrative disclosures.  
Table 1, Panel D, shows the ratings awarded by customers for the various reporting items 
about the product aspect (PR). The highest mean score for the reporting items was 8.08 and 
the lowest was 6.62. Related to the disclosure types, out of 9 items in the product aspect, 
customers assigned the highest scores for the items with both monetary and numerical 
disclosures (88.89% or 8 items), and one item with narrative disclosures (11.11%). They 
assigned the lowest scores to the items with narrative disclosures (55.56% or 5 items), 
monetary disclosures (33.33% or 3 items), and one item with numerical disclosures (11.11%). 
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< Insert Table 1 about here> 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. As shown in Table 2, the sample mean value of 
EQ is 67.0. A higher EQ implies a higher level of earnings quality. The AQ measure has a 
mean value of 0.06. PERSIS, which captures (the negative of) the extent to which an earnings 
innovation remains in the series, has a mean value of -0.44. PREDICT has a mean value of 
0.07. Finally, SMOOTH, which captures the variability of income relative to the variability 
of cash flows, has a mean value of 0.48.  
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index (CSD_INDEX) ranged from 3 per 
cent to 23 per cent with a mean of 10 per cent, which reveals that CSD of listed firms in the 
sample is low. This is because CSD practices are relatively new in Vietnam (Vu, Tower, and 
Scully 2011a). The findings are consistent with the study by Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a), 
which examines the quantity of voluntary disclosure, including social disclosure, in Vietnam. 
Four different social aspects of disclosure, i.e., labor (LAD_INDEX), society 
(SOD_INDEX), product (PRD_INDEX), and human rights (HRD_INDEX), have mean 
scores of 17 per cent, 4 per cent, 16 per cent, and 1 per cent, respectively2.  
The average percentage of state ownership in our sample is 27 per cent (with a range of 
zero to 79.07 per cent), and this represents a highly concentrated ownership by the state. 
Because of the 49 per cent maximum foreign ownership ceiling in Vietnamese listed firms, 
the average percentage of foreign ownership is quite low (12 per cent with a range of zero to 
49 per cent). The average of FEMALE is approximately 14 per cent and there are no all-
female boards.  
< Insert Table 2 about here> 
                                                            
2 The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional labour aspect disclosure index (LAD_INDEX) is computed for each 
firm using the equation similar to the equation of calculating the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD 
index but measures only with labour aspect. This is similar to measure SOD_INDEX, PRD_INDEX and 
HRD_INDEX. 
Page 17 of 34 
 
Four individual earnings attribute measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH) are 
highly correlated, with coefficients of more than 0.3 (results are not tabulated but are 
available upon request), suggesting reasonable factorability (Hair 1998). Additionally, the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.76 for the overall test and more than 
0.7 for each earnings attribute measure (not tabulated), above the commonly recommended 
value of greater than 0.5 (Hair 1998). The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (χ2 (6) = 
235.82, p < 0.000). Adopting the ‘eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule’ (Hair 1998), this study 
reduces the number of factors to one because there is only one factor with eigenvalue of 2.68 
(not tabulated). Factor analysis suggests that a single factor represents these four earnings 
attribute measures, and they accounted for 66.90 per cent of the total variance, above the 
criterion of 60 per cent (Hair 1998). Hence, it is proper to combine the four earnings 
attributes measures into a single standardized aggregate measure of earnings quality. This 
approach is similar to Leuz et al. (2003), who used factor analysis to clarify the combination 
of four individual earnings management measures into a standardized aggregate earnings 
management score. 
Regression analyses and findings  
This study checked for the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression models. Because 
the individual values of VIF are less than 10 for all the regression models, multicollinearity 
does not seem to be a problem for the test models in this study (Gujarati and Porter 2009).  
To confirm whether or not heteroscedasticity exists, this study used the Breush-Pagan 
test. The p-values were found to be significant (p < 0.04), thus the null hypothesis is rejected, 
indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. To correct the possible influence of 
heteroscedasticity, OLS regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors (White 
1980) was used to test the effect of earnings quality (EQ) on CSD (CSD_INDEX), and the 
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moderating effect of the ownership structure (i.e., EQ*FOREIGN and EQ*STATE) on the 
relationship between earnings quality and CSD. 
Table 3 provides the results for the tests of hypotheses 1A, 1B, 2, and 3, using 
CSD_INDEX as the dependent variable. The independent variables were EQ, 
EQ*FOREIGN, and EQ*STATE. Two models examined the relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variables and the results are reported in Table 3.  
Column (1) of Table 3 examines the relationship without interacting variables in equation 
(4). In that model, the coefficient estimate of the standardized aggregate earnings quality 
(EQ) is positive and significant (α1 = 0.0003, p = 0.079). This indicates that firms that report 
high quality earnings also have high CSD. This result confirms hypothesis 1B (i.e., there is a 
positive relationship between earnings quality and CSD). 
Column (2) of Table 3 adds the interaction variables between STATE and EQ and 
between FOREIGN and EQ in the model (equation (5)). They are included to reveal the 
effects of state and foreign ownership on the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. 
The coefficient of EQ is still positive and significant (α1 = 0.0008, p = 0.007), while the 
coefficient of the interaction variable between STATE and EQ is negative and significant (-
0.0015, p-value of 0.034) as shown in Column (2) of Table 3, which confirms hypothesis 2 
(i.e., more state ownership will weaken the relationship between earnings quality and 
stakeholder-relevant CSD) suggesting that firms with more state ownership and with high 
earnings quality, are likely to report less stakeholder-relevant CSD. After adding the 
interaction variable of STATE and EQ, the results show that it is likely that EQ, and STATE, 
have substitutive effect on stakeholder-relevant CSD. When the earnings quality becomes 
low in a state-owned company, the state-owned company is likely to decrease the 
stakeholder-relevant CSD. Additionally, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of 
FOREIGN and EQ is negative (-0.0012) but insignificant (p value = 0.295), suggesting that 
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foreign ownership does not have an effect on the relationship between earnings quality and 
CSD, which rejects hypothesis 3 (i.e., more foreign ownership strengthens the relation 
between earnings quality and CSD). This result is consistent with the study conducted by 
Choi et. al. (2013) in Korea, which documents that the presence of foreign investors does not 
influence the relationship between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility 
ratings. There are two possible reasons for this. First, it could be that foreign investors may 
experience difficulties in controlling managerial behavior because of the geographical 
differences, language, and culture (Xiao and Yuan 2007, Choi, Lee, and Park 2013). Second, 
the 49 per cent maximum foreign ownership ceiling also can limit the power of foreign 
investors to influence the reporting behavior of the firm (Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a).  
< Insert Table 3 about here> 
The results for control variables shown in Table 3 indicate a significant positive 
association (p values < 0.003) between AUDIT and CSD_INDEX, which suggests that the 
quality of CSD is higher for firms that are audited by the big four audit firms, consistent with 
prior studies (Craswell 1992, Inchausti 1997, Uwuigbe and Egbide 2012). Return on asset 
(ROA) has positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that firms with better financial 
performance are likely to make more CSD, as is consistent with the existing literature (Khan 
et al., 2013; Lu and Abeysekera, 2014; Haniffa and Cooke 2005). The STOCK_EX is 
positively and significantly (p values < 0.0001) correlated with CSD_INDEX, which indicates 
that firms listed on HOSE are likely to engage in significantly more CSD than firms listed on 
HNX. This is consistent with Vu (2012), who examined determinants of voluntary disclosure 
for Vietnamese listed firms. FOREIGN is not significantly related to CSD_INDEX in column 
(1), which is consistent with prior studies (Said, Hj Zainuddin, and Haron 2009, Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005). In the context of this study, this is probably because the 49 per cent maximum 
foreign ownership ceiling limits the power of foreign investors to influence the reporting 
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behavior of the firm (Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a). Similarly, STATE is not significantly 
related to CSD_INDEX in column (1), consistent with the findings of Naser et al. (2006) and 
Lu and Abeysekera (2014). This may reflect the business models in a country like Vietnam 
where shares of most listed firms are owned by the government. If the government owns 
shares in most firms listed on the stock exchange, these firms will have little incentive to 
make voluntarily disclosures, including CSD. In column (2) of Table 3, although FOREIGN 
is not significantly related to CSD, STATE is positively and moderately significant (p value = 
0.063) with CSD_INDEX. FEMALE is positively significant (p values = 0.01) with 
CSD_INDEX. This is consistent with prior studies (Zhang, Zhu, and Ding 2013, Post, 
Rahman, and Rubow 2011). 
Additional analysis and robustness tests 
The standardized aggregate earnings quality score without accruals quality  
Wysocki (2006) expresses concerns about using accruals quality (AQ) as an attribute to 
measure earnings quality because this attribute can drive results of earnings quality, 
subjugating other attributes. More specifically, Wysocki finds that current cash flows are 
simultaneously significantly and negatively related to current accruals. Wysocki notes that 
although there are other dimensions in a composite earnings quality measure, the accruals 
quality is the most discerning and damaging dimension. Guided by Wysocki, to ensure that 
results in this study are not simply driven by AQ, all tests are repeated with an alternative 
earnings quality by averaging the firm rankings for the three standardized aggregated 
individual earnings attributes measures (EQ_3ATTRI: earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, and earnings smoothness) only. The results are presented in Table 4. 
< Insert Table 4 about here> 
The results as shown in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 3 and hence support 
hypothesis 1B (i.e., there is a positive relationship between CSD and earnings quality), 
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confirming hypothesis 2 (i.e., more state ownership will weaken the relationship between 
earnings quality and CSD), but rejecting hypothesis 3 (i.e., more foreign ownership 
strengthens the relation between earnings quality and CSD). The exception is that the effect 
of STATE on CSD_INDEX in column (2) of Table 4 is not statistically significant, with a p-
value of 0.13. Additionally, the impact of earnings quality on CSD in column (1) of Table 4 
is more significant than that of Table 3 (p = 0.037 vs. p = 0.079) whereas the interaction term 
of state ownership and earnings quality in Table 4 is less significant than that in Table 3 (p = 
0.077 vs. p = 0.034). Overall, these results show that findings in this study are not simply 
driven by accruals quality and are generally consistent when using alternative proxies for 
earnings quality. 
Earnings quality and labor and society aspects of disclosure quality  
Pham (2011) documents that managers of Vietnamese firms focus greatly on charity and 
employment matters, such as health and safety and the working environment, in corporate 
social policies. Choi et al. (2013) also state that these two aspects, society and labor, help to 
counter adverse public opinions and ease strain firms have with the government and labor 
unions. Following Choi et al. (2013), this study constructed another social disclosure index 
consisting of two aspects, i.e., society (10 items) and labor (15 items) only, rather than the 
four aspects (i.e., society, labor, human rights, and product responsibility) included in the 
main model. The results are provided in Table 5. They are consistent with the main findings 
in Table 3.  
< Insert Table 5 about here> 
Endogeneity 
The main results provide evidence of a positive relationship between earnings quality and 
CSD. One concern here is that the relationship may be endogenous, potentially biasing the 
results. Because the sample size in this study is quite small (133 firms), to address the 
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endogeneity issue, this study estimates CSD_INDEX and EQ regressions using the limited-
information maximum likelihood (LIML) method.3  
We use the length of the operating cycle (LOG.OC), measured as the log of the sum of 
the firm’s days accounts receivable and days inventory, and the incidence of net loss 
realizations (LOSS), computed as the number of years where the firm reported a loss as 
instruments for EQ in both models in equations (4) and (5) in order to test for reverse 
causality—that is, CSD influences earnings quality. The study assumes that these innate 
variables do not affect CSD (at least directly) but do affect EQ. Francis et al. (2005) also 
found that these two variables as innate factors of a firm influence earnings quality. 
The LIML generates instrumental variables, and then tests whether those instrumental 
variables are weakly correlated with the suspected endogenous variable, earnings quality. 
Instrumental variables help to establish the causal effect. The null hypothesis in the LIML is 
that a weak correlation between the instrumental variables (instruments) and the earnings 
quality (suspected endogenous variable) indicates that earnings quality is endogenous.  
< Insert Table 6 about here> 
As shown in Panel A of Table 6 related to the model examining the relationship without 
interacting variables in equation (4), the F statistic is 10.74, which is above the often-used 
threshold of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). This indicates that this model contains one 
endogenous regressor (Staiger and Stock 1997). Additionally, Stock and Yogo (2005) show 
that a set of instruments is weak if a Wald test at the 5% level can have an actual rejection 
rate of no more than 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25%. Therefore, Panel A of Table 6 shows that here 
it can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak, since the F statistic of 10.74 > 
8.68 (the critical value for a rejection rate of at most 10%). On the basis of this test, the model 
                                                            
3 We obtain consistent results using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation (See Table S1, available online). 
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in equation (4) of this study does not have a weak-instrument problem. Earnings quality in 
the OLS model is an independent and also an exogenous variable.  
In contrast, Panel B of Table 6 shows that the model in equation (5) of this study has a 
weak-instrument problem. The F statistic is 6.17, which is below the threshold of 10 (Staiger 
and Stock 1997). In addition, the F statistic of 6.17 < 8.68 (the critical value for a rejection 
rate of at most 10%), which cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Therefore, 
this study relies on the OLS results for the model in equation (5).  
To verify the validity of the instruments in the model in equation (4), this study does a 
test for over-identifying restrictions. The results show that the p-values of Anderson-Rubin’s 
statistic and Basmann’s statistic are 0.797 and 0.804, respectively. This indicates that 
instruments in this model are not correlated with the error of the main regression. Therefore 
the LIML estimators are superior to the OLS estimators in the model in equation (4).   
This study uses the same set of control variables as in Table 3 for CSD in the LIML 
regression. The results reported in Table 7, using the superior LIML estimators for the model 
examining the relationship without interacting variables in equation (4), support the primary 
finding in this study that earnings quality positively impacts CSD.  
< Insert Table 7 about here> 
Conclusions  
The paper explores the relationship between CSD and earnings quality of Vietnamese listed 
firms and also examines the effects of state and foreign ownership on the relationship 
between CSD and earnings quality. The results support hypothesis 1B but not hypothesis 1A, 
meaning that the long-term perspective argument dominates the managerial opportunism 
hypothesis in the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. Specifically, our findings 
suggest that earnings quality is positively and significantly associated with CSD. We also 
find that the relationship between earnings quality and CSD is weakened as the percentage of 
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shares held by government increases, which confirms hypothesis 2. Meanwhile, the presence 
of foreign investors does not influence the association between earnings quality and CSD, 
which rejects hypothesis 3. Robustness tests also confirm these results. 
In addition to the contribution from this study noted in the Introduction section, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first concerted attempt to examine the relationship between 
earnings quality and CSD for the small and newly emerging market of Vietnam. Vietnam is 
one of the lowest ranked countries in protecting investors among the Southeast Asian 
countries. In addition, the empirical results which demonstrate the current CSD practices of 
Vietnamese listed firms and stakeholders’ perceptions to CSD, will benefit regulators in 
better understanding firms’ CSD practices and stakeholders’ expectations. The evidences can 
be references for Vietnamese authority to improve the current guidelines on the stakeholder-
relevant CSD of Vietnamese listed firms. Furthermore, despite becoming a fast-growing 
economy with increasing prominence in the Asia-Pacific, the Vietnamese economy is still 
relatively under-examined, particularly with regard to its accounting and finance aspects (Vu, 
Tower, and Scully 2011b). This study reflects an attempt to fill the gap in the literature by 
extending the understanding of firms earnings quality, stakeholder-relevant CSD, and the 
moderating effect of ownership structure in the Vietnamese context. 
We acknowledge that the sample size and confining the analysis of disclosure to 2010 
year may limit the generalizability of results. We chose the survey and annual reports 
analysis to obtain clarity about the role Circular No. 09/2010/TT-BTC dated January 15, 
2010 play in the transparency of disclosure of listed firms and stakeholders’ perspectives. The 
requirement of five years’ rolling data to measure accruals quality while the two Vietnamese 
stock exchanges with HOSE established in 2010 and HNX established in 2005, also 
influenced the year of choice in the study. Studies document that firms’ disclosure policies 
appear to remain relatively constant over time (Muttakin and Khan 2013, Healy, Palepu, and 
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Sweeney 1995). A longitudinal study where disclosure policies have varied within the time 
period can provide different insights. This study found the Audit firm selection (Big four 
versus otherwise) and female board representation are likely to increase stakeholder-relevant 
CSD, can bring forth a future study to examine the influence of other internal and external 
corporate governance measures on corporate social disclosure.  
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Table 1. List of 45 items with the mean importance weighted by four stakeholder-specific 
groups for disclosure items and types, in their order of relative importance of items.  
 
Panel A  
List of 15 labor items and the mean importance weighted by employees for disclosure items 
and disclosure types. 
Labor items 
(LA) 
Mean weight 
of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
LA11 7.47 6.53 6.75 6.92 7.51 86 
LA7 7.38 6.28 6.00 7.17 7.06 14 
LA8 7.29 6.49 6.31 7.02 6.97 52 
LA4 7.28 6.22 5.99 7.19 6.92 26 
LA5 7.28 6.34 5.99 7.09 6.84 4 
LA9 7.27 6.54 6.37 7.06 6.88 28 
LA3 7.18 6.15 7.00 7.19 7.68 7 
LA2 7.15 6.03 5.85 6.92 6.69 38 
LA12 7.11 6.65 6.10 7.10 7.12 57 
LA10 7.05 6.20 6.02 6.94 6.90 89 
LA1 6.97 5.77 5.85 7.04 7.27 124 
LA14 6.78 5.84 6.35 6.74 7.16 54 
LA15 6.7 5.73 5.69 6.88 6.90 8 
LA6 6.47 5.94 5.60 6.69 6.34 15 
LA13 6.44 5.97 5.27 6.53 6.26 133 
 
Panel B  
List of 11 human rights items and the mean importance weighted by lawyers and regulators for 
disclosure items and disclosure types.  
Human rights 
items (HR) 
Mean weight 
of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
HR7 8.19 5.27 5.90 7.90 6.64 2 
HR11 7.98 5.19 6.00 7.52 7.36 4 
HR4 7.9 5.28 5.25 7.64 6.78 9 
HR6 7.89 5.43 6.07 7.89 7.21 1 
HR5 7.28 4.91 5.23 6.99 6.32 5 
HK9 7.19 5.26 5.62 6.79 6.61 3 
HR3 7.18 4.62 5.64 7.03 6.82 10 
HR8 6.93 5.53 5.83 6.96 6.53 1 
HR10 6.71 4.87 5.17 6.45 6.41 5 
HR1 6.69 4.71 6.01 7.05 7.68 6 
HR2 6.38 4.55 5.30 6.75 6.97 1 
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Panel C  
List of 10 items of societal aspects and the mean importance weighted by local communities for 
disclosure items and disclosure types. 
Societal items 
(SO) 
Mean weight 
of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure Total number of 
firms disclosing 
item 
Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both 
monetary 
and 
numerical 
SO2 7.92 4.91 6.35 6.50 7.58 1 
SO8 7.81 5.49 6.98 6.99 7.90 11 
SO1 7.67 4.61 6.53 6.04 7.97 60 
SO10 7.52 5.06 5.87 6.22 7.43 25 
SO4 7.41 5.11 6.10 6.55 7.55 3 
SO7 7.35 5.45 6.12 6.36 7.38 23 
SO9 7.26 4.79 5.58 6.09 7.32 7 
SO3 7.24 5.06 5.74 6.57 7.34 0 
SO6 6.94 4.88 6.21 6.09 7.33 1 
SO5 6.22 4.88 5.46 5.73 6.44 0 
 
Panel D 
List of 9 product items and the mean importance weighted by customers for disclosure items and 
disclosure types 
Product items 
(PR) 
Mean weight 
of items 
disclosed 
Mean weight of each type of disclosure Number of 
firms disclosing 
item Narrative Monetary Numerical 
Both monetary 
and numerical 
PR1 8.08 5.22 6.14 6.58 7.68 83 
PR5 8.07 6.30 6.17 7.08 7.76 42 
PR9 7.8 5.61 6.56 6.70 8.09 7 
PR8 7.77 5.97 6.02 6.64 7.11 0 
PR3 7.71 5.88 5.43 6.09 6.74 133 
PR7 7.64 5.56 5.62 6.49 7.35 16 
PR6 6.98 6.05 5.68 5.60 5.89 133 
PR2 6.94 5.57 5.63 6.21 6.53 6 
PR2 6.62 5.59 5.28 5.57 6.13 0 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variable   
CSD_INDEX 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.23 
Four sub-categories of CSD – Additional analysis       
LAD_INDEX 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.41 
SOD_INDEX 0.04 0.05 0 0.23 
PRD_INDEX 0.16 0.05 0.1 0.3 
HRD_INDEX 0.01 0.04 0 0.25 
Independent variable 
EQ 67.00 24.74 1.00 112.00 
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Four earnings attributes to construct the standardized aggregate earnings quality score 
AQ 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.40 
PERSIS -0.44 0.86 -2.80 4.78 
PREDICT 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.40 
SMOOTH 0.48 0.45 0.03 2.65 
Control variables       
STATE 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.79 
FOREIGN 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.49 
AUDIT 0.16 0.37 0 1 
ROA 0.08 0.08 -0.17 0.39 
STOCK_EX 0.68 0.47 0 1 
FEMALE 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.60 
This table shows summary statistics for variables used in this paper. The final sample consists of 133 firms listed 
on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges for the 2010 sample.  
CSD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; 
LAD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional labor aspect disclosure index;  
SOD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional society aspect disclosure index; 
PRD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional product responsibility aspect disclosure index; 
HRD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional human rights aspect disclosure index; 
EQ = the standardized aggregate earnings quality score, calculated as the average rank across the four individual 
measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness);  
AQ, PESIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH = the values of accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, 
and earnings smoothness, respectively; 
STATE = the percentage of shareholding owned by the state; 
FOREIGN = the percentage of shareholding owned by foreign investors; 
AUDIT = 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big 4 and 0 if otherwise; 
ROA = net profit over the total assets; 
STOCK_EX = 1 if the firm is listed on HOSE and 0 for firms listed on HNX; 
FEMALE = the percentage of female members in the board of directors.  
 
Table 3.  
The relationship between earnings quality and stakeholder-relevant CSD and the 
moderating effect of the ownership structure on this relationship. 
CSD_INDEX (1)  CSD_INDEX (2) 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
EQ 0.0003* 0.079  0.0008*** 0.007 
EQ x STATE    -0.0015** 0.034 
EQ x FOREIGN    -0.0012 0.295 
STATE -0.0056 0.763  0.0925* 0.063 
FOREIGN -0.0284 0.357  0.0379 0.604 
AUDIT 0.0334*** 0.002  0.0343*** 0.001 
ROA 0.1105** 0.046  0.1055* 0.054 
STOCK_EX 0.0306*** 0.000  0.0326*** 0.000 
FEMALE 0.0643*** 0.010  0.0633*** 0.010 
Constant 0.0429 0.007  0.0080 0.727 
R2 0.2507  0.2796 
Adjusted R2 0.2088  0.2268 
F statistic 5.98***  5.3*** 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
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Mean VIF 1.31  5.15 
The sample consists of 133 firms listed on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a continuous 
listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for the 2010 sample. The p-values are calculated using 
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.  
Stakeholder-relevant CSD and earnings quality: Excluding the accruals quality 
measure in the standardized aggregate earnings quality score. 
  CSD_INDEX (1)   CSD_INDEX (2) 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
EQ_3ATTRI 0.0003** 0.037 0.0007*** 0.009 
EQ_3ATTRI x STATE -0.0012* 0.077 
EQ_3ATTRI x FOREIGN -0.0008 0.419 
STATE -0.0058 0.754 0.0717 0.130 
FOREIGN -0.0263 0.390 0.0196 0.770 
AUDIT 0.0326*** 0.002 0.0338*** 0.001 
ROA 0.1095** 0.043 0.1042* 0.053 
STOCK_EX 0.0302*** 0.000 0.0317*** 0.000 
FEMALE 0.0630*** 0.010 0.0627** 0.011 
Constant 0.0422*** 0.004 0.0161 0.434 
R2 0.2583 0.2789 
Adjusted R2 0.2168 0.2261 
F statistic 6.22*** 5.29*** 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.28   4.59 
EQ_3ATTRI is the firm-specific standardized aggregate earnings quality score proxy, the average rank across 
three measures (PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH). The sample consists of 133 firms listed on Ho Chi Minh 
and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a continuous listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for 
the 2010 sample. The p-values are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. ∗, ∗∗, and 
∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 5.  
Earnings quality and labor and society aspects of stakeholder-relevant disclosure 
quality  
  LAD&SOD_INDEX (1)   LAD&SOD_INDEX (2) 
  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
EQ 0.0004* 0.061 0.0012*** 0.005 
EQ x STATE -0.0019** 0.045 
EQ x FOREIGN -0.0021 0.165 
STATE 0.0010 0.969 0.1276* 0.061 
FOREIGN -0.0132 0.754 0.1094 0.276 
AUDIT 0.0334** 0.020 0.0341** 0.018 
ROA 0.1525** 0.044 0.1450* 0.053 
STOCKEXCHANGE 0.0347*** 0.003 0.0381*** 0.001 
FEMALE 0.0909*** 0.008 0.0909*** 0.007 
Constant 0.0402* 0.065 -0.0104 0.741 
R2 0.2138 0.2445 
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Adjusted R2 0.1698 0.1892 
F statistic 4.86*** 4.42*** 
p-value 0.0001 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.31   5.15 
LAD&SOD_INDEX represents society and labor aspects of the disclosure index (the dependent variable). 
 
Table 6.  
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Panel A: Earnings quality and CSD 
Variable R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 F Prob > F 
EQ 0.308 0.263 0.148 10.74 0.0001 
Critical Values               # of endogenous regressors:  1 
Ho: Instruments are weak     # of excluded instruments:  2 
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test 8.68 5.33 4.42 3.92 
 
Panel B: The moderating effect of ownership structure on the relationship between earnings 
quality and CSD 
Variable R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 F Prob > F 
EQ 0.797 0.781 0.092 6.17 0.0028 
Critical Values               # of endogenous regressors:  1 
Ho: Instruments are weak     # of excluded instruments:  2 
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test 8.68 5.33 4.42 3.92 
 
 
Table 7.  
Earnings quality and stakeholder-relevant CSD using limited-information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) regression method 
EQ STATE FOREIGN AUDIT ROA STOCKEXCHANGE FEMALE Constant 
Coeff. 0.0008 -0.0125 -0.0381 0.0356 0.1665 0.0350 0.0719 0.0049 
p-value 0.066 0.521 0.231 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.004 0.886 
Significance * *** ** *** *** 
R2 = 0.196, Wald statistic = 41.71, p-value = 0.000, N = 133. 
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
